

2nd Monitoring Report

of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour

A Product of the EU-Technical Seminar on Aid Effectiveness

30 November 2009

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Key messages..... | 3 |
| 2. Background..... | 4 |
| 3. Status of division of labour processes | 5 |
| 4. Participation by partners and donors | 6 |
| 5. Measuring impact..... | 8 |
| 6. Obstacles and enabling factors for division of labour..... | 9 |
| 6.1 Obstacles..... | 9 |
| 6.2 Enabling factors | 10 |
| 7. Conclusions and Recommendations | 11 |
| | |
| Annex 1: List of the monitoring results October 2009 | 13 |
| Annex 2: Country-Level Questionnaire on the implementation of Division of Labour | 15 |

Prepared by Urs Buercky and Philipp Knill

Special thanks to all country facilitators of the Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour for their comprehensive answers to the questionnaire, to the members of the EU Technical Seminar on Aid Effectiveness for their valuable comments and to Almut Brunckhorst for coordinating the feedback from the country facilitators.

1. Key messages

- 1. Division of Labour (DoL) is dealt with differently in all 28 partner countries that are reviewed in this monitoring report. In many of these 28 partner countries results are encouraging. There is some preliminary evidence that DoL processes are moving from analysis to action. But substantive issues will have to be tackled.*
- 2. Strengthening partner countries' ownership for Division of Labour (DoL) processes and their capacity to design and conduct such processes jointly with donors remains a challenge.*
- 3. Communication between donor country offices and headquarters (HQs) needs to be intensified to ensure that information gathered in-country and proposals coming from the country level are followed by adequate decisions at HQs. Aid portfolios of different donors need to be more focused and complementary with each other to fulfil commitments made in the EU Code of Conduct.*
- 4. As results and impacts of DoL can only be achieved in the medium term, commitment and active participation of all stakeholders is needed over several years. Lead donor arrangements, joint assistance strategies, joint programming and delegated cooperation are essential steps to show early results and create a momentum of change.*

2. Background

(1) The EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity (FTI-DoL) aims to support a selected group of partner countries in the process of achieving in-country Division of Labour (DoL). In implementing the initiative, EU Member States (MS) and the European Commission (COM) systematically cooperate with partner countries on the ground, using the principles of the May 2007 EU Code of Conduct on DoL as their main point of reference. Improved DoL is to increase efficiency and effectiveness of aid delivery, thus contributing to improved development results. DoL can be understood as part of the harmonisation agenda but should for the purpose of the paper not be confused with donor coordination. While donor coordination is about dealing with the given situation of many donors working in the same area but not changing this situation per se, DoL is about changing this situation by reducing the number of donors in overcrowded sectors and increase it in orphan sectors. Nevertheless in most countries donor coordination and DoL are happening at the same time and interlink into each other.

(2) A first monitoring of the status quo of DoL implementation in 22 partner countries was conducted in December 2008. Results were widely shared and perceived as valuable input to the international discussion on DoL. Members of the FTI-DoL agreed to continue the monitoring on a regular basis. This paper presents the findings of the second monitoring round which took place in September and October 2009. All results and conclusions presented here are still subject to further validation.

(3) The questionnaire¹ was sent out to 25 Fast-Track-Countries² and additionally to 11 countries³ which are not part of the FTI-DoL. Responses from the facilitating donors in the following 28 partner countries are integrated in this report: Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam and Zambia. This means that there is a 96% return to the questionnaire from the FTI countries plus 4 responses from non-FTI countries.

¹ A copy of the questionnaire is attached in Annex 2.

² The Fast Track Countries are (according to the concept note of the FTI-DoL, updated in January 2009): Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam and Zambia.


³ The additional countries are: Honduras, Afghanistan, Nepal, Egypt, Palestine, Yemen, DR Congo, Morocco, South Africa, Indonesia, and Malawi.

(4) In 10 countries⁴, donors and the partner country representatives answered jointly. In some more countries, the partner government is still considering the questionnaire. In many cases, answers came from donors or EU donors only.

3. Status of division of labour processes

(5) DoL processes usually go through three stages. First of all, some kind of assessment of the status quo takes place e.g. through a donor mapping. In a second step donors elaborate on their respective comparative advantages and partner governments are asked to articulate their preferences. Finally donors and partner countries implement an improved DoL regime by reprogramming aid or using delegated cooperation. In this section we try to assess in which stage of the DoL process the FTI Countries are in, notwithstanding that the stages can also overlap.


(6) Progress regarding DoL varies significantly between the countries participating in the Fast-Track-Initiative. Good performers in implementing DoL can be found in all regions covered in this monitoring exercise but seem to cumulate especially in eastern and southern Africa. Overall, the solid results on donor mapping, lead donor arrangements and reprogramming are encouraging.



(7) Feedback from both monitoring rounds (2008 and 2009) shows that the instrument of donor mapping is widely used. The opposite seems to be the case for comparative advantage assessments which are only used in one third of the countries covered in this monitoring

⁴ Albania, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia.

survey. Most of these comparative advantage assessments are based on self-evaluation. Assessments by peers or the partner government are rare. The absence of jointly agreed sector definitions in more than half of the countries monitored identifies clear sector definitions as a common challenge for stronger DoL. Lead donor arrangements continue to play an important role in the majority of cases and cross-cutting issues like human rights, gender and environment are quite often covered in the respective agreements or by specifically assigning lead donors for some of the cross cutting issues.



(8) Finally, reprogramming of individual donor portfolios towards better DoL seems to have taken place in 2009 as compared to 2008. A deeper look into the data reveals that reprogramming is not always driven by agreements on the country level but due to portfolio decisions in donor headquarters (HQ). Non-DoL-related reasons like political shifts within the partner country play a major role in decisions of donors to pull out of certain sectors or leave the country completely. While some donors pull out of overcrowded sectors, new engagement in so-called orphan sectors was not reported. Clearly, reprogramming needs sufficient time to be implemented and responsible exit strategies have to accompany the process, so quick-fixes must not be expected.

4. Participation by partners and donors

(9) Division of Labour seems to be a process which is promoted by donors. Most partner governments approve progress triggered by donors but only rarely take an active role in steering the process. There has been little progress in strengthening partner ownership of DoL since the last monitoring.

(10) Some positive exceptions exist in Rwanda, Uganda and Malawi where the partner government is in a clear leading role (in Rwanda and Uganda the agenda is strongly promoted by the head of state) and Zambia, Albania, Cambodia⁵ and Ukraine where the government facilitates the process in close dialogue with donors. Not all of these governments are adopting the suggestions of the EU Code of Conduct but those opting out have developed their own understanding of how to drive DoL processes to make them serve their national interests.

⁵ There are different perceptions of the Cambodian government's level of commitment by the donors and the government itself. Data presented in this report reflects the answers given by the government of Cambodia.

(11) With ownership being the key principle of both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action donors have to be careful to engage in a way that supports partner countries priorities and strengthens their leadership. The three reasons for weak ownership of partner governments stated in the last monitoring report (fear of losing control over ODA, low aid management capacities and overall low political priority for development cooperation) continue to be valid and can be addressed in various ways, e.g. through high level meetings between donors and partner country representatives, proactive communication on the opportunities of DoL and support for the development of aid management capacities. The European Commission and some EU member states have utilized these approaches in some of the FTI partner countries.

(12) While donors put more and more effort into coordinating their interventions, many partner countries struggle with the task to manage ODA flows to their countries. Capacity development for strategic aid management and aid management systems should be an integral component of DoL processes. The Fast Track Initiative could strengthen its support in this area.

(13) Among the donors, EU Member States clearly show the strongest commitment to promoting the DoL agenda. Nevertheless, in their responses to the questionnaire enthusiasm is limited by persisting challenges. The few existing efforts to integrate non-DAC bilateral donors, vertical funds and private foundations have not yet yielded tangible results. In six countries all DAC-donors participate in the DoL process. For some countries, the growing activities of non-DAC donors, vertical funds and private foundations are counterproductive to the existing efforts for stronger DoL and donor coordination. This problem needs to be adequately addressed at HQs level, as many vertical funds receive their funding from bilateral donors and private foundations frequently do not have field staff.


(14) In countries where the EU Code of Conduct has been the starting point and major vehicle of the DoL process, non-EU donors do show limited interest in DoL. Reasons for this might be twofold: the Code of Conduct gives no clear guidance on how to actively integrate other donors into the EU driven process and certain bilateral and multilateral donors with broad aid portfolios are hesitant to engage in DoL processes. Contrary to the international agreement on division of labour in the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Good Practice Principles on Country-led Division of Labour, some multilaterals claim at the country level that their statutes impede their involvement in DoL processes.

(15) Some facilitators state that DoL is of little importance in their partner country as there are only few active donors. At the same time statistics from the OECD-DAC show that the number of donors in these respective countries is clearly above average. Further statistical work on aid fragmentation and proliferation from the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness could provide helpful information on this.

5. Measuring impact

(16) Differentiating between the effects of donor coordination, DoL and other aid effectiveness activities is rather difficult. In addition, the results here are based on perceptions of donor field and partner government staff. Therefore, they should be interpreted with caution.


Graph 3 - Contribution to Aid and Development Effectiveness



(17) Feedback regarding the quality of sector dialogue is more encouraging as the percentage of facilitators who see improvement is consistently high. However, some comments suggest that quality of political dialogue in sectors might suffer if staff in donor agencies is reduced and authority delegated to a single lead donor.

(18) Allocation of aid across sectors is perceived to be slightly more rational but evidence on this issue is still rather weak. In some countries there is even evidence to the contrary with more and more donors focusing on the same sectors. Sometimes these are new or “fashionable” sectors like climate change or environment and sometimes sectors which are perceived as particularly relevant in the specific partner country.

Graph 4 - Impact of Division of Labour



6. Obstacles and enabling factors for division of labour

6.1 Obstacles

(19) Most of the obstacles mentioned in the last monitoring report of the FTI (2008) remain relevant. The issue of limited partner country ownership and the reluctance by donors to leave attractive sectors are still the major obstacles to in-country DoL. Nevertheless some progress can be witnessed, as certain obstacles which were prominently mentioned in the last report are no longer brought up as notably as before: The lacking clarity of donor roles (especially the roles of lead, active and silent donors) is only raised in a few cases. Limited capacities on donor side, lack of information on who is involved in which sector and the question of legal and administrative barriers which hinder donors to be involved in delegated cooperation are not mentioned as frequently as before. The lesser attention paid to these issues might indicate that ways to better deal with them have been found. The fact that information regarding donor allocation per sector is no longer lacking may be explained by the high number of donor mappings taking place.

(20) While some were not mentioned any more or to a lesser extent, new obstacles give rise to concern, according to the country facilitators. Most of this new impeding issues can be considered as obstacles in themselves but are closely linked to two major obstacles for DoL processes mentioned above, i.e. limited country ownership and donors' reluctance to leave sectors.

(21) One of the causes for low government ownership might be the growing number of parallel aid effectiveness initiatives which conflict with the already existing capacity constraints of partner governments.

(22) Several factors may explain donors' reluctance to leave certain sectors. Those most prominently mentioned are the fear of smaller donors to lose influence when delegating part of their portfolios to other donors, and the pressure from HQs to stay engaged in sectors due to interests of sectoral departments or questions of political influence and donors' image.

(23) Delays in implementing the DoL agenda are also due to different planning cycles: while donors aiming to align with national strategies need to adjust to the programming cycle of partner governments, their decisions, for example regarding the design and implementation of an exit strategy, are also determined by planning and budgeting cycles in their own countries.

6.2 Enabling factors

(24) Engagement of EU MS and COM is generally perceived as a major enabling factor for DoL. The will of many development partners to implement the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action seems to be a strong driving force as well. The positive role of donors acting as DoL champions was cited repeatedly. In some countries, targeted TA-support by the FTI-DoL facilitators seems to bear fruits. The most relevant enabling factor is certainly the growing awareness of some partner governments regarding the significance of strong aid management structures within the government to achieve greater aid effectiveness. Unfortunately, as mentioned in section 4 this only applies in a small number of partner countries.

(25) Engagement in joint assistance strategies seems to be a supporting factor for DoL as well as the right timing: DoL should be brought to the agenda while the partner government is formulating new national or sectoral development strategies and donors are deciding on their support. Like other reform processes the success of DoL depends on good relations among donors and between donors and the partner government. Existing donor coordination mechanisms might create a climate of mutual trust which is paying off when it comes to engaging in DoL.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

(26) In most partner countries a basic assessment of the status quo has taken place (see figures on donor mapping and other preparatory DoL exercises). It now seems to be time to take further steps to actually consolidate portfolios and re-program as appropriate. Some action on this can be witnessed, however, re-programming in many cases seems to be independent of DoL-processes, i.e. mainly the result of unilateral decision taken by donors due to their political priorities. This might in part be due to a gap between in-country information gathering and decision-making on HQ level and ultimately by the limited leadership of the partner country government. One of the solutions suggested by country facilitators is to delegate more authority with regard to programming decisions to the country-level. This would also enable a more regular dialogue with partner country governments.

(27) It is becoming increasingly clear in the qualitative parts of the responses in the questionnaires that DoL is far away from being a technical and non-political issue. Therefore, it can be argued that approaches which solely focus on the technicalities of DoL are destined to fail. All actors promoting DoL processes (and the aid effectiveness agenda as a whole) have to become more sensitive to issues of political economy both concerning the partner government and the donor community.

(28) On the side of the partner country, intra-governmental power balance, in particular between different ministries, plays an important role and can decelerate or accelerate DoL processes. Donor harmonisation and DoL processes tend to strengthen coordinating ministries (finance or planning) at the expense of line ministries. Donors should be aware of this when promoting DoL.

(29) On the donors side, feedback suggests that donors' approaches towards development cooperation are not always interchangeable.⁶ Therefore, the whole issue of comparative advantages and clear communication of partner country preferences in division of labour seems to be an important area of renewed and deepened attention.

(30) Finally, there is the issue of flexibility by donors if partners are supposed to show leadership on DoL. Especially in situations in which donors have developed a sophisticated structure to better coordinate their aid and engage themselves in numerous working groups and harmonisation meetings, there is the risk that donors perceive stronger government ownership as negative. Therefore taking the division of labour agenda serious involves a certain degree of flexibility by donors.

⁶ This is also supported by a study on donors leaving certain sectors or countries. Those sectors/countries left are not always picked up by another donor (Gómez, Margarita Puerto and Schulz, Nils-Sjard (2009): The champion's orphans: Honduras says goodbye to Sweden, FRIDE Project Report, September 2009, Internet: <http://www.fride.org/publication/662/>

(31) Regarding the technical dimension of DoL this monitoring exercise can lead to the following preliminary recommendations:

- Capacity development for strategic aid management by the partner country (including aid management systems) should be strengthened within the FTI.
- EU donors should invest more efforts in involving other donors (including, vertical funds, non-DAC donors, foundations, etc.) in DoL. Parallel EU processes should be avoided and be adjusted to local coordination processes if possible.
- Comparative advantages and preferences by partner countries need to be taken into account more seriously to avoid negative effects of division of labour decisions on the quality and coverage of aid.
- Engagement in joint assistance strategies and joint programming exercises, the timing of bringing DoL on the agenda and compatibility of different programming cycles by donors and partners are issues that need further consideration in the respective country contexts in order to facilitate DoL processes instead of standing in their way.
- The FTI needs to work harder on its internal information sharing mechanisms including HQ and field level. Facilitating donors from the different FTI countries should get a better opportunity to exchange their views and learn from each other's experiences. Regional seminars and video conferencing might be useful tool to this end. High-level meetings can focus efforts on DoL in a given country.
- Although the issue has been raised by only a small number of country facilitators there still seems to be the need for HQs to support local representations to prepare or adapt legal, financial and administrative requirements for new forms of cooperation (silent vs. leading roles, delegated cooperation).

Annex 1: EU Fast Track Initiative for Division of Labour: List of the monitoring results October 2009 (27 partner countries)

A product of the EU Technical Seminar on Aid Effectiveness (0 – no answer provided)

Partner Countries covered by the FTI-DoL

| | 1.a | 1.b | 1.c | 1.d | 1.e | 1.f | 2.a | 2.b | 3.a | 3.a | 3.b | 3.c | 3.d | 3.e | 3.e | 5.a | 5.b |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Partner Country Dev. Strategy | Donor Mapping | Comparative Advantage Assessment | Sector definitions agreed | Lead Donor Arrangements | Reprogramming underway? | Commitment of partner government | Participation by all donors? | Transaction costs partner diminished? | Transaction costs donor diminished? | Quality of sector dialogue improved? | Aid Volume changed? | Aid across sectors rationalised? | Contribution to Aid Effectiveness | Contribution to Development Effectiveness | Lead facilitators well prepared? | Satisfied with HQ communication? |
| Albania | yes | yes | no | yes | no | 0 | Facilitating | no | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | small | small | yes | yes |
| Bangladesh | yes | yes | no | no | no | no | Approving | no | no | no | don't know | 0 | don't know | small | small | yes | no |
| Benin | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | No interest | no | don't know | don't know | don't know | same volume | no | none | none | yes | yes |
| Bolivia | yes | yes | no | no | no | yes | Approving | no | don't know | don't know | yes | don't know | no | small | small | yes | no |
| Burkina Faso | yes | yes | no | no | yes | no | Approving | yes | no | no | no | same volume | no | none | none | yes | yes |
| Burundi | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | yes | No interest | no | no | no | no | don't know | no | small | none | yes | no |
| Cambodia | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | Facilitating | no | don't know | don't know | don't know | don't know | don't know | small | small | 0 | 0 |
| Cameroun | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes | Approving | yes | no | no | yes | same volume | yes | small | small | yes | yes |
| Ethiopia | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | Approving | no | no | don't know | yes | don't know | no | small | small | no | yes |
| Ghana | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | yes | Approving | no | 0 | no | yes | 0 | no | medium | medium | no | yes |
| Kenya | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | Approving | no | 0 | don't know | don't know | don't know | don't know | small | none | yes | yes |
| Kyrgyz Republic | yes | no | no | no | no | no | No interest | no | no | no | no | same volume | no | none | none | no | yes |
| Madagascar | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | no | Facilitating | no | no | no | yes | more aid | yes | medium | small | no | no |
| Mali | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | yes | Approving | yes | no | no | yes | same volume | yes | small | medium | yes | no |
| Mongolia | yes | no | no | no | no | no | Approving | no | no | no | no | same volume | no | none | small | no | yes |
| Mozambique | no | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | Approving | yes | don't know | no | yes | same volume | don't know | small | small | 0 | yes |
| Nicaragua | yes | yes | no | 0 | yes | yes | No interest | no | don't know | don't know | yes | less aid | no | small | small | yes | no |
| Rwanda | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes | Leading role | no | yes | yes | yes | same volume | no | medium | small | yes | yes |
| Senegal | no | no | no | no | no | yes | Approving | no | don't know | don't know | don't know | don't know | don't know | small | small | no | yes |
| Tanzania | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | 0 | Approving | yes | 0 | 0 | don't know | same volume | don't know | small | none | yes | no |
| Uganda | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | Leading role | yes | don't know | 0 | yes | 0 | don't know | medium | small | yes | yes |
| Ukraine | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes | Facilitating | no | 0 | 0 | yes | same volume | no | small | none | no | no |
| Vietnam | yes | yes | no | no | yes | yes | Approving | no | yes | yes | yes | more aid | yes | medium | medium | yes | yes |
| Zambia | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | Facilitating | no | yes | 0 | don't know | same volume | yes | medium | medium | yes | yes |

Additional non-FTI Countries

| | 1.a | 1.b | 1.c | 1.d | 1.e | 1.f | 2.a | 2.b | 3.a | 3.a | 3.b | 3.c | 3.d | 3.e | 3.e | 5.a | 5.b |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Partner Country Dev. Strategy | Donor Mapping | Comparative Advantage Assessment | Sector definitions agreed | Lead Donor Arrangements | Reprogramming underway? | Commitment of partner government | Participation by all donors? | Transaction costs partner diminished? | Transaction costs donor diminished? | Quality of sector dialogue improved? | Aid Volume changed? | Aid across sectors rationalised? | Contribution to Aid Effectiveness | Contribution to Development Effectiveness | Lead facilitators well prepared? | Satisfied with HQ communication? |
| Honduras | no | 0 | no | 0 | 0 | no | Approving | no | no | no | yes | don't know | yes | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malawi | yes | yes | no | yes | no | no | Leading role | no | no | no | yes | 0 | yes | medium | none | no | no |
| Morocco | no | yes | yes | no | no | no | No interest | no | yes | yes | yes | same volume | don't know | medium | small | 0 | 0 |
| Nepal | no | yes | no | no | yes | 0 | 0 | no | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Annex 2:

Country-Level Questionnaire on the implementation of Division of Labour

2nd Monitoring of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour - September 2009

To be completed by the EU facilitating donor of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour in coordination with partner country representatives, EU and non-EU donors present in the partner country.

| | |
|---|--|
| Country: | Date: |
| EU facilitating donor: | Name of the facilitating donor representative: E-mail address of the facilitating donor representative: |
| Partner country institution and representative responsible: | |
| Responses approved by partner country: | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Responses coordinated with other donors: | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |

| 1. Status of the process: | |
|---|--|
| 1.a. Is there a generally accepted national development strategy / plan and / or joint assistance strategies which form or could form the basis for decisions on division of labour? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> <i>If yes, please name it</i> |
| 1.b. Has a donor mapping taken place? <i>(please attach relevant documents or internet link if available)</i> | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1.c. Have comparative advantages been identified in a systematic assessment? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1.d. Is there an agreed definition of sectors / cooperation areas between the partner country government and donors as a basis for division of labour? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1.e. Are lead donor arrangements established? <i>(please attach relevant documents or internet links if available)</i> | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> <i>If yes, please name the sectors / areas and the lead donor:</i> |
| | Lead Donor(s) Sector/Area |
| Are cross <u>cutting issues</u> (e.g. human rights, gender, environment) addressed in these lead donor arrangements (e.g. by agreeing on specific lead donors or integrating these issues explicitly into other sectors/areas)? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1.f. Is reprogramming underway (do donors concentrate their aid in focal sectors and in turn move out of other sectors or use the modality of delegated cooperation)? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |

| <p><u>If yes:</u> Please name sectors/areas where donors are moving out and/or are delegating cooperation (please attach relevant documents or internet links if available)</p> | Sector/ area | Donor | Moving out | Delegating |
|--|-----------------|-------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Comments on 1.a, b, c, d, e and f: | | | | |
| <p>1.g. What has the partner country government and the donor community undertaken to promote the implementation of division of labour? What actions are foreseen in the future?</p> | | | | |
| 2. Participation in the division of labour process: | | | | |
| <p>2.a. Commitment by the partner country (government and parliament)</p> <p>(i) <i>Leading role and directing the process:</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(ii) <i>Facilitating the process in close dialogue with donors:</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(iii) <i>Approving progress triggered by donor initiative:</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(iv) <i>No interest in division of labour between donors, not approving progress:</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> | | | | |
| <p>2.b. Participation by donors</p> <p><i>Do all ODA donors in the partner country participate in the division of labour process?</i> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><i>Please name the donors with strong commitment for division of labour:</i></p> <p><i>Do non-DAC donors / private donors / foundations participate in the process? Please specify.</i></p> | | | | |
| Comments on 2.a and b. | | | | |
| If applicable: What are the reasons for weak commitment from donor or partner country side? | | | | |
| 3. Towards measuring impact of division of labour processes: | | | | |
| If there is no clear evidence on the issues please give an educated guess | | | | |
| <p>3.a. Have transaction costs diminished through division of labour?</p> <p>(i) <i>For the partner country:</i> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Educated guess:</p> <p>(ii) <i>For the donors:</i> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Educated guess:</p> | | | | |
| <p>3.b. Has the quality of sector policy dialogue improved? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Educated guess:</p> | | | | |
| <p>3.c. Has the division of labour process had an impact on overall aid volume? <i>The partner country receives...</i> (1) <i>more aid</i> <input type="checkbox"/> (2) <i>less aid</i> <input type="checkbox"/> (3) <i>same volume</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Educated guess:</p> | | | | |
| <p>3.d. Is aid allocation across sectors more rational (less orphan and/or over-crowded sectors, needs and priorities by the partner country are more</p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Educated guess:</p> | | | | |

| | |
|---|--|
| adequately addressed)? | |
| 3.e. Considering all changes promoted and supported by the division of labour process (see questions 3a-d and possibly others), how would you evaluate its contribution to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. A more relevant, <u>effective and efficient aid system</u> in the partner country (Aid Effectiveness)? i. None <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> ii. <u>MDG-achievement/poverty reduction</u> in and sustainable development of the partner country (Development Effectiveness)? ii. None <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Comments: | |
| Justify your answers on 3: | |
| 4. General comments | |
| 4.a. What have been the major obstacles in the process so far? Do you envisage more obstacles in the future? | |
| 4.b. What have been the enabling factors so far? Do you see a role of donor headquarters in facilitating progress? | |
| 4.c. Any other comment: | |
| 5. For lead facilitators only: | |
| 5.a. Do you feel well prepared for your role as lead facilitator of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Comments: | |
| 5.b. Are you satisfied with the communication by your HQ in regard to the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Comments: | |
| 6. Suggestions to improve the questionnaire | |

Please send this questionnaire until 2nd October 2009, to the Facilitators of the Fast Track Initiative (please do not forget to attach relevant documents on the division of labour process in your country if available, e.g. donor mapping, table on lead donor arrangements and/or sectoral involvement of donors):

European Commission (DG Development), Almut Brunckhorst,
Almut.BRUNCKHORST@ec.europa.eu

and
 Germany (BMZ, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), Philipp Knill,
Philipp.Knill@bmz.bund.de

Thank you for your participation!